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Outbreaks, Driving Factors, and
Development
Outbreaks of emerging infectious dis-
eases place significant burden on public
health and global economies [1]. The
process leading to spillover, localized
emergence, and finally pandemic spread
is complex, but is generally driven by
underlying ecological, political, or socio-
economic changes [2,3] (Figure 1). These
‘‘drivers’’ [2,4] include for example, cli-
mate change, urbanization, international
travel and trade, land use change, and the
breakdown or complete lack of public
health measures. Yet despite the growing
literature on driving factors [4], the impact
of these drivers lacks appropriate attention
and is currently an understudied area of
research [5].
Examining a dataset of outbreaks of
international concern assembled as part of
a recently published study by Chan et al.
[6], we assess the distribution of outbreaks
across driving factors. We find that the
most prominent driver is the breakdown
or lack of public health infrastructure and
argue that there is a mismatch between the
drivers of public health events and current
trends in public health spending and
pandemic prevention. We propose a
three-pronged approach within develop-
ment agencies as the most promising
solution to this disconnect. The approach
includes: (1) Developing policies that deal
with different stages of emergence, from
spillover and localized outbreaks to pan-
demic spread; (2) Actively engaging a
systems approach to pandemic prevention
that changes pathogen dynamics at the
intersection of people and their environ-
ment; and (3) Shifting the funding frame-
work in development agencies from short-
term emergency funding to a longer-term
strategy.
Determining Drivers of
Outbreaks of International
Concern
Epidemiological data on officially con-
firmed outbreaks of international concern
collected by the Global Alert and Re-
sponse (GAR) department of the World
Health Organization (WHO) can facilitate
understanding of threats to global health,
with particular attention to the local
spread of pathogens (Figure 1B) at the
critical juncture following spillover into
humans but preceding pandemic spread.
Events of ‘‘international concern’’ are
published in Disease Outbreak News
(DON, available online, http://www.
who.int/csr/don/en/) and defined ac-
cording to the International Health Reg-
ulations (IHR) as either specific diseases
(Table S1) or events that are ‘‘serious’’ or
‘‘unusual’’ or pose the potential risk of
spreading globally or imposing restrictions
on travel or trade (http://www.who.int/
ihr). The inclusion criteria for events
evolved from 1969 when the IHR covered
only six diseases, to amendments in 1973
and 1982 to focus specifically on cholera,
yellow fever, and plague, and to revisions
again in 1995 to cover almost all public
health risks (biological, chemical, radiolog-
ical, or nuclear), though these final revi-
sions were only formally adopted in 2005
and did not go into effect until 15 June
2007. The IHR now require states to have
or develop ‘‘minimum core public health
capacities,’’ including the detection, as-
sessment, and notification of events.
Using the Chan et al. [6] dataset of 397
outbreaks from DON reports between
1996 and 2009, we identified the proxi-
mate driver implicated in each outbreak
through manual evaluation of WHO
outbreak reports related to each event
(Text S1). Driving factors were defined
according to the Institute of Medicine
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C(IOM) [2] with modifications as in Jones et
al. [4], including the re-classification of
‘‘economic development and land use’’
and ‘‘technology and industry’’ to form
more descriptive categories: ‘‘agricultural
industry changes,’’ ‘‘medical industry
changes,’’ ‘‘food industry changes,’’ ‘‘land
use changes,’’ and ‘‘bushmeat’’ (See Text
S1 for a full list of drivers). Drivers were
assigned on the basis of a text search of the
outbreak reports for key words and
phrases indicating an IOM-defined driver
directly or inferred from text describing
actions taken immediately following the
outbreak (Table S2). Breakdown of public
health measures accounted for the largest
fraction (39.5%) of outbreaks (Figure 2;
Table S3). According to the IOM [2],
breakdown of public health measures
includes inadequate sanitation and hy-
giene, e.g., the shortage of potable water,
poor immunization coverage or the lack of
infrastructure to purchase and deliver
vaccine, and the deterioration of vector-
borne and zoonotic disease control. We
include the absence of public health
infrastructure in ‘‘breakdown of public
health measures,’’ but use the IOM
naming construct of ‘‘breakdown’’ for
consistency. All other drivers accounted
for 10% or less of outbreaks each (Table
S3). While many of these outbreaks do not
pose a pandemic threat, they are evidence
of an environment that may prove unable
to deal with a novel pandemic threat.
Limitations to Determining
Drivers of Outbreaks of
International Concern
The ability to accurately assess the
driving factors of outbreaks and target
aid is limited by strong disincentives that
still exist for states to report outbreaks of
disease (e.g., disruption to tourism or
trade) [7]. Further, a lack of standard
practices for sharing biological samples
limits our ability to detect and report
disease threats rapidly. The Nagoya Pro-
tocol to the Convention on Biological
Diversity set the groundwork for sample
sharing, but does not include human
samples and still requires significant delib-
eration prior to implementation of a fair
sharing system [7].
Despite disincentives and surveillance
issues, the significant subset of events that
do get reported thorough IHR mecha-
nisms point to a role for development in
preventing future outbreaks. Currently,
the role of international development in
global health and pandemic prevention
programs in the United States and inter-
nationally is being debated.
The Changing Role of
International Development in
Pandemic Prevention
Historically, dealing with infectious
disease outbreak threats has been under
the aegis of state, national, and interna-
tional public health agencies (e.g., US
Centers for Disease Control, WHO), and
basic public health infrastructural devel-
opment has been the responsibility of
bilateral and international development
aid agencies (e.g., United States Agency
for International Development [USAID]
and World Bank, respectively), and na-
tional and international non-governmental
organizations (e.g., Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation). There has been an increased
role for bilateral and international devel-
opment aid agencies in addressing pan-
demic prevention as a development issue,
typically funded through emergency re-
sponse avenues. This shift followed the
emergence of highly pathogenic H5N1
avian influenza, in which developing
countries such as Indonesia and Egypt
were identified as regions with repeated,
small-scale outbreaks that suggested
chronic persistence [8]. The connection
between H5N1 and backyard poultry
production in particular has led to signif-
icant interest and support in a ‘‘systems
approach’’ to combating avian influenza
as a development agenda driven by
agricultural, cultural, poverty, and equity
constraints, rather than a purely human
health issue (also see http://www.
apeiresearch.net/main.php) [9]. These ef-
forts have led to broader programs
including inter-agency ‘‘One Health’’ ini-
tiatives, and global programs specifically
Summary Points
N The way in which public health programs are designed and funded has
changed significantly; however, the trend toward establishing vertical, disease-
specific global health programs may be at the cost of strengthening basic
public health infrastructure and development in the long term.
N In a review of nearly 400 public health events of international concern, we
found that a breakdown or absence of public health infrastructure was the
driving factor in the largest fraction of outbreaks (39.5%). No single other
driving factor accounted for more than 10% of outbreaks.
N The relative roles of emergency response versus long-term development
strategies to mitigate infectious disease threats are being debated within
bilateral and intergovernmental aid agencies.
N We propose a systems approach within development agencies to address
pandemic prevention at the intersection of people and their environment
where the risk of disease emergence is highest. To achieve this goal,
mainstream development funding, rather than emergency funding, is required.
Figure 1. Figurative description of the
multi-scale, multi-step process of pan-
demic emergence. Pandemic impact is
highest when diseases are transmitted rapidly
from human to human, and spread via travel
and trade networks (A). At that point, their
impact is greatest in developed countries,
with economic dependence on globalized
travel and trade (e.g., SARS). However, most
emerging diseases do not reach this stage,
and emerge in localized outbreaks, often
small and contained (B, red spikes), or
spillover repeatedly from animals (B, green
line). Here, control is most effective at the
countries of origins that are often developing
countries, where breakdown of public health
measures exacerbates human-to-human
spread. Prior to localized outbreaks of zoono-
ses, perturbations in the environment lead to
spillover of pathogens from one animal
species to another or their range expansion
(C, green circles). The most effective pandem-
ic prevention at this early stage would be via
measures that target the underlying causes of
disease emergence.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001354.g001
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threats through development [10,11].
Within development agencies trends in
health spending have moved from broad
systems based investments to a more
specialized, infectious disease model, result-
ing in a decline in systems capacities,
potentially contributing to increased risk
of disease spread. According to the Orga-
nization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), infectious disease
control aid commitments have increased
from 8% between 1990 and 1998 to 16%
between 2005 and 2008, while basic health
infrastructure aid commitments have de-
clined from 11% to 5% during this period.
In response, aid has been criticized as
duplicative and inefficient, aimed at high-
profile diseases (e.g., HIV/AIDS) rather
than public health in general, and too often
tiedtoshort-termnumericaltargets,suchas
patients treated or lives saved [12]. Further,
the proliferation of donors with program-
specific ‘‘earmarking’’ of funds for vertical
spending may create a fragmented land-
scape of development aid and translate into
additional costs on donor and recipient
countries [13]. Therefore, the decline in
broad health systems capacities could be
due not simply to the structure of aid being
too vertical or ‘‘stovepiped’’ along ‘‘high
profile diseases,’’ but also to inflexible
funding cycles bent on metrics with little
long-term effect. While vertical programs
do have their successes, often programmat-
ic and structural details helped overcome
the vertical nature of the program, e.g., the
high coverage of excellent and evolving
vertically oriented interventions that con-
tributed to smallpox eradication [14].
Conclusion and
Recommendations
We suggest a central role for develop-
ment agencies in pandemic prevention and
highlight three critical policy issues. The
first is to develop policies that deal with
different stages of emergence, from spill-
over and localized outbreaks to pandemic
spread. Stronger public health infrastruc-
ture (e.g., expanded surveillance, better
diagnostic capacity, and rapid reporting
and control) in developing countries will
likely help prevent localized outbreaks of
newly emerged pathogens becoming pan-
demic. For example, in China the SARS
crisis exposed weaknesses in the health
system and the ability to effectively com-
municate and control an epidemic threat
[15]. China has made a series of changes to
public health policy and infrastructure
specifically targeting SARS-like illnesses,
as well as other emerging diseases [16,17].
It is likely that any futurespilloverof SARS,
either from animals or via laboratory
accidents, or emergence of a similar but
novel disease would be less likely to result in
international spread [17–19]. Similarly,
extensive national and intergovernmental
efforts to detect and control influenza A/
H5N1 in Indonesia and other southeast
Asian countries may have played a role in
the lack of sustained human-to-human
transmission in the region [20]. The
majority of the events that the WHO has
classified asinternationallysignificantarein
fact vaccine preventable or can be con-
tained with basic public health measures,
e.g., yellow fever, polio, cholera, and
meningitis, making the bulk of events in
the Chan et al. [6] dataset preventable.
These generalized approaches are distinct
from efforts to target specific diseases that
have emerged, particularly those with
rapid, silent (during the asymptomatic
period) transmission, such as the proposed
distribution of oseltamivir as a prophylaxis
during the early stages of the 2009 H1N1
pandemic [21]. Here, the practicalities of
distribution among individuals or house-
holds to achieve optimal coverage proved
difficultandthis modelof pandemiccontrol
via prophylaxis is seen as overly optimistic
[22,23], especially in the context of a
developing country.
Second, we propose that development
agencies should actively engage a systems
approach to pandemic prevention that
changes pathogen dynamics at the inter-
section of people and their environment,
broadening the development toolkit signif-
icantly and imaginatively. A systems
approach to pandemic prevention moves
beyond the ‘‘One Health’’ concept of
linking human and veterinary medicine
with an understanding of environmental
drivers of health to focus also on the socio-
ecological context of disease emergence
[24]. There has been significant move-
ment in One Health, however, ‘‘operatio-
nalizing’’ One Health seems to hit a glass
ceiling because there is not a specific
defined budget among the agencies, and
each relevant agency competes for funds.
For H5N1, reducing the risk of the
emergence of a new pandemic variant
includes increasing biosecurity on poultry
farms and within backyard flocks [25] as
well as strengthening surveillance along
routes from farms to markets. To address
the key drivers of most pandemics, this will
mean development agencies playing a role
in such diverse strategies as strengthening
animal health diagnostic laboratories,
training veterinarians in public health
(e.g., epidemiology for disease surveillance,
outbreak detection, investigation, and
intervention), the promotion of biosecurity
measures on farms, educating bushmeat
hunters on disease risks, and working with
the extractive industries in emerging
Figure 2. The number of outbreaks by driver, with the subplot representing the
subdrivers within the category ‘‘breakdown of public health measures’’ (Table S3).
The number of outbreaks as taken from the Chan et al. [6] dataset of DON reports attributed to
different ecological, socioeconomic, and political drivers. There are some inherent uncertainties
in the reported set of outbreaks, and biases in the reporting of disease outbreaks have been
discussed previously [4,6]. As the breakdown of public health measures accounted for the
greatest number of outbreaks, for that driver, three additional subcategories were examined,
including inadequate sanitation and hygiene, poor immunization coverage, and vector-borne
and zoonotic disease control measures (e.g., bednets and improved drainage to eliminate
standing water). Drivers associated with fewer than ten events (which included ‘‘human
susceptibility to infection,’’ ‘‘land use changes,’’ and ‘‘medical industry changes’’) were combined
into the single category ‘‘other.’’ Outbreak events with unassigned or uncertain drivers (e.g.,
disagreement between sources) were labeled as ‘‘unspecified.’’
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001354.g002
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risk of new pathogens emerging (See figure
1 in [6]). In 2009, USAID launched the
Emerging Pandemic Threats program
with the specific aim of reducing opportu-
nity for the emergence of new, potentially
pandemic zoonoses at their source by
building local public health capacity to
predict, identify, respond to, and prevent
disease emergence (http://avianflu.aed.
org/eptprogram/).
Third and finally, we point to the need
for a critical shift in the funding framework
from which disease-oriented development
assistance is administered. Within develop-
ment agencies, pandemic prevention pro-
grams are most commonly funded through
emergencyordisasterreliefmechanisms.In
this transition, development agencies
should consider adopting a long-term
funding strategy that invests in a develop-
ment approach to pandemic prevention
consistent with a systems approach. These
recommendations align with others who
have urged previously for a strengthening
of national health systems with a ‘‘diago-
nal’’ approach [26], where interest in
particular initiatives or diseases can be used
to drive broad-based improvements to the
overall public health system. Not only will
this better address the most significant
global health threats, but it will also provide
the broad scale first line of defense against
the next unknown contagion.
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